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CASE COMMENTS

Constitutional Law-West Virginia Better Schools AmendmentLegislative Extension Unconstitutional
Appalachian Power Company, a Virginia corporation, suing in
its own behalf and in behalf of all other taxpayers of Mercer County,
West Virginia, sought a declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court
of Mercer County in proceedings against the County Court of
Mercer County and the individual members of the court to determine
the validity of certain tax levies by the county court for airport
improvement bonds. The circuit court held the levies invalid and
respondents appealed. Held, judgment affirmed. The 1958 amendment to the state constitution authorizing additional tax levies, W. VA.
CONST. art. X, § 10, commonly known as the Better Schools Amendment, relates only to levies for public school purposes. It does not
authorize an airport bond levy in excess of maximum limits authorized by the 1932 Tax Limitation Amendment, W. VA. CONST. art.
X, § 1. Thus W. VA. CODE ch. 13, art. 1, § 35 (Michie Supp.
1960), to the extent it undertook to confer additional levying power
on the county courts, is unconstitutional, and levies made by a
county court in pursuance thereof were invalid. Appalachian Power
Co. v. County Court of Mercer County, 118 S.E.2d 531 (W. Va.
1961).
The genesis of the problem resolved in the instant case is found
in the 1932 Tax Limitation Amendment, which limits the taxing
power of local tax-levying bodies and places all property located
in the state into one of four classes. The amendment provides that
the legislature shall make provision for increasing the maximum
rates on the four classes of property in a particular taxing unit
when approved by the voters of that taxing unit. At least sixty
per cent of the qualified voters must favor such an increase, the
increase shall not continue for more than three years at a time,
and it shall never exceed by fifty per cent the maximum rates provided by the amendment. See Warden v. County Court of Taylor
County, 116 W. Va. 695, 183 S.E. 39 (1935). The legislature subsequently enacted W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 8 (Michie 1955) to
implement this amendment. See Wilson v. County Court of Clay
County, 114 W. Va. 603, 175 S.E. 224 (1934).
The court in the instant case points out that when the Tax
Limitation Amendment was adopted, W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 8
remained unchanged. This latter section concerns the bonded in-
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debtedness of counties, cities, school districts and municipal corporations. Subsequently it was held in Finlayson v. City of Shinnston,
113 W. Va. 434, 168 S.E. 479 (1933), that the term "aggregate
of taxes" as used in the Tax Limitation Amendment plainly and unequivocally means "all the taxes." Thus, levies made for the purpose of paying interest and creating sinking funds for bonded indebtedness created subsequent to its adoption are required to be
within the maximum levies as provided by the amendment.
In 1950 the section concerning bonded indebtedness was amended to permit levies outside the limits of the Tax Limitation Amendment ". . . to pay the interest and principal on bonds issued by any
school district. . . ." (Italics added.) The court in the instant case

states that clearly section 8 constitutes a limitation on all other
bonded indebtedness, making it necessary that the levies for such
indebtedness fall within the limits fixed by the Tax Limitation
Amendment.
In 1956 the voters declined to ratify a proposed amendment
to W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1, which was designed to liberalize
levies for public school purposes. In 1957 the legislature proposed
W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 10, which was ratified by the voters on
November 4, 1958. This new section was designated the Better
Schools Amendment, and, as pointed out by the court, the official
ballot used in voting on the amendment was designated "Ballot
on 'Better Schools Amendment'." Under this amendment a one
hundred per cent increase in "the maximum rates authorized and
allocated by law" for levies "for the support of public schools" is
allowed, and the increase may be for a period of not more than
five years when the proposed increased levy is approved by at
least sixty per cent of the qualified voters "of the school district."
In 1959 two enabling acts were passed by the legislature pursuant to the Better Schools Amendment. The first of these, as
interpreted by the court in the instant case, deals only with bonds
issued for school purposes by school districts. W. VA. CODE ch. 13,
art. 1, § 4 and 34 (Michie Supp. 1960). These sections generally
follow the letter and spirit of the Better Schools Amendment, and
specifically provide that taxes levied thereunder may be outside
the limits fixed by the Tax Limitation Amendment.
The second enabling act is the one with which the instant case
is concerned. W. VA. CODE ch. 13, art. 1, § 35 (Michie Supp. 1960).
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This enactment purported to authorize levies outside the limits fixed
by the Tax Limitation Amendment, whereby counties, magisterial
districts and municipal corporations might pay off the principal and
interest of their bonded indebtedness "now or hereafter contracted."
The court noted at least two controlling reasons why the Better
Schools Amendment can not be held to apply to these governmental
units. The first is implicit in the title of the amendment itself.
When the people of West Virginia voted on the amendment, the
title of it undoubtedly conveyed to them that they were voting
only for "better schools," a term which is certainly not synonymous
with "better airports." Secondly, nowhere in the amendment is
there an express reference to counties, magisterial districts or municipal corporations. Rather there are numerous phrases expressly refering to "school districts" and "public schools." Clearly, then,
the amendment is clear and unambiguous. When this is evident,
the court must apply and not interpret the amendment. Since this
1959 enactment clearly violates the West Virginia Constitution, it
became the duty of the court to declare the provision unconstitutional and void. State ex rel. Trent v. Sims, 138 W. Va. 244, 77
S.E.2d 122 (1953).
The court did not find it necessary in its decision to detail the
legislative history of the amendment as proposed at the 1957 session of the West Virginia Legislature. As initially approved and
passed by the Senate, the language of the proposed amendment was
obviously more strongly limited to public school levies. Journal of
House of Delegates, W. Va. Legislature, 1957, page 768, Senate
Joint Resolution No. 8. When amended by the House of Delegates,
Journal, pages 1257-1259, some language more precisely indicating
the school levy intent gave way to more general language, but the
resolution remained the "Better Schools Amendment." The same
intent was manifest in the act of the legislature submitting the constitutional amendment to the voters for ratification or rejection
at the 1958 general election. W. Va. Acts 1957, ch. 17.
Additional levying powers and additional taxes may be urgently
needed by the local governmental units, but such objectives must
be accomplished within constitutional limits. The solution of the
problem rests with the legislature and the people, not with the
courts. If it is felt that excess levies for such projects as airports
are necessary, the legislature may propose to the voters a constitutional amendment which will adequately allow these governmental
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bodies to lay excess levies. Less than thirty years ago the voters
constitutionally limited tax levies. Their disapproval of a liberalizing
amendment in 1956 indicated a reluctance to vest additional tax
levying powers in governmental units. In the instant case the court
squarely points out that the voice of the people must be expressed
through constitutional language before the legislature may effect
such tax levy increases.
Frederick Luther Davis, Jr.
Damages-Torts-Punitive Damages Denied Against
Joint Tort-Feasors
P brought an action for libel against a newspaper publishing
company and two individual defendants. During the course of the
trial P offered evidence which shed light on the financial worth of
the individual defendants, but P did not show the worth of the publishing company. Two jury verdicts were returned for P, one of
$50,000 compensatory damages, and one of $50,000 punitive damages. Held, although in such a case P would ordinarily be able to
recover punitive damages, when more than one party is made defendant, P waives his right to punitive damages. Dunaway v. Troutt,
339 S.W.2d 613 (Ark. 1960).
The principal case adheres to what is called a majority rule in
deciding this case. This majority is said to hold that since a judgment for punitive damages against more than one party might actually result in greater punishment for one joint tort-feasor than
another who is equally liable, plaintiff waives his right to punitive
damages when he sues more than one party. The leading case adhering to this view apparently is Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lansden,
172 U.S. 534 (1898), which held in effect that there was no justice
in allowing a recovery of punitive damages based on evidence of the
ability to pay of only one of a number of defendants. However, the
principal case failed to point out the Court's own reservations in
the Lansden case when it was pointed out that the rule did not prevent the recovery of punitive damages in all cases involving joint
defendants. The Court further said: "What the true rule is in such
a case is not . . . certain." 172 U.S. 534, 553.

There are courts which unhesitatingly hold in accordance with
the views expressed in the principal case, an example being the
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